Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers: the Mexican Case 2012 by Huesca, Luis & Araar, Abdelkrim
     
Huesca : Département d’économique, CIRPÉE, Pavillon J.-A.-DeSève, Université Laval, Québec, Canada G1V 0A6 
Phone (1) + 418 656-2131 
luis.huesca@ecn.ulaval.ca 
Araar : Département d’économique, PEP & CIRPÉE Research Fellow 
araar.abdelkrim@ecn.ulaval.ca 
 
This work was carried out with funding from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) for his 
support under the grant ES1-10010-2013-01 and PEP research network. The authors are also grateful Jean-Yves 
Duclos, Rolando Cordera, Agustín Escobar, Enrique Valencia, Miguel Reyers and Sylvain Dessy for their valuable 
comments and their hospitality. I also thank to Arturo Robles-Valencia for assistance with the data. 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 14-07 
 
 
 
 
Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers: the Mexican Case 2012 
 
 
Luis Huesca 
Abdelkrim Araar 
 
 
 
 
 
Février/February 2014 
 
Abstract:   
The paper examines the redistributive effect achieved by the tax-benefit system in 
Mexico in 2012 using personal income tax, indirect taxes, social security contributions 
and social benefits. Our goal is to analyze progressivity of the fiscal system and go 
further to demonstrate how the different taxes and benefits contribute to the total 
redistribution effect. A set of popular tools of studying progressivity, such as the 
concentration curves and Kakwani progressivity index, are used. In addition, we propose 
an analytical method to decompose the total progressivity measured by the contributions 
of different taxes or benefits. We conclude that Mexican tax-benefit system is 
progressive, with greater pre-fiscal income inequality and high redistributive effect for 
some specific figures of transfers. The contribution from Vertical Equity (VE) is relatively 
important, but Horizontal Inequity (HI) lightens its impact. Income taxation does not 
contribute largely to VE. Further, some program benefits target unequally the deprived 
population, and then decreases the positive effect induced by VE. 
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1.	Introduction	
	
During	the	 last	century,	 taxation	and	social	 transfers	have	been	of	great	relevance	for	many	
Latin	American	countries	including	Mexico.	The	transfers	related	to	social	programs	provide	
income	 assistance	 in	 the	 form	 of	 social	 benefits	 to	 deprived	 people,	 being	 unemployed,	 for	
maternity,	 food	 stamps,	 work	 injury,	 sickness,	 old	 age,	 or	 even	 for	 training	 to	 increase	
opportunities	 in	 the	 labor	 market.	 Many	 of	 these	 transfers	 are	 financed	 by	 social	 security	
contributions,	as	well	as	by	other	taxes	(direct	or	indirect).	In	this	paper,	we	focus	on	tax	and	
benefit	 systems	 consisting	 of	 social	 transfers,	 personal	 income	 tax	 and	 indirect	 taxes	 in	
Mexico.	 Tax	 and	 benefit	 systems	 have	 a	 significant	 influence	 on	 disposable	 income	
distribution	when	they	are	able	to	reduce	market	income	differences.	
Mexico	appears	as	a	country	with	high	levels	of	income	inequality	and	we	try	to	provide	some	
elements	that	contribute	to	highlight	this	inequality	as	well	as	to	provide	a	basis	to	improve	
the	 tax	 system	 and	 depicting	 general	 lines	 for	 future	 fiscal	 reforms.	Our	 aim	 is	 to	 compute	
total	progressivity,	comparing	between	the	progressivity	for	total	taxes	as	well	as	that	of	total	
transfers,	and	showing	the	most	progressive	taxes	or	transfers	for	this	country	in	2012.	The	
hypothesis	is	that	liabilities	on	total	taxation	are	slightly	progressive	in	Mexico.	Indeed,	even	
for	 the	 income	 tax	 where	 low‐income	 earners	 have	 a	 low	 tax	 burden,	 this	 progressivity	 is	
lightened	by	the	non‐progressivity	of	VAT.	
“Equal	 must	 be	 treated	 equally”:	 this	 ethical	 value	 is	 related	 with	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
Horizontal	inequality	(HI)	on	redistributive	effect,	and	where	the	governmental	intervention	
may	increase	income	disparities.	To	assess	the	extent	of	HI	and	its	impact,	we	adopt	Duclos‐
Jalbert‐Araar	 (2003)	 approach	 (DJA	 henceforth).	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 also	 develop	 a	 new	
methodology	 to	 decompose	 the	 total	 progressivity	 of	 any	 fiscal	 system	 by	 tax	 and	 benefit	
components.	
The	studied	benefits	concern	in	general	the	social	assistance	programs	(such	as	programs	for	
the	elderly,	Oportunidades	program	for	the	poor,	food	aid	and	assistance	for	the	unemployed	
with	 temporary	employment,	as	 the	most	relevant).	The	selection	 is	based	on	 the	relevance	
and	the	potential	to	fight	poverty	of	these	programs.	Only	four	prior	benefits	described	have	
recently	 shown	 a	 high	 level	 of	 progressivity	 on	 its	 allocation	 for	 the	 Mexican	 households	
(CONEVAL,	 2009).†	 Such	 programs	 should	 have	 a	 greater	 impact	 on	 these	 groups	 of	
individuals	and	taxpayers,	i.e.	should	be	the	main	recipients	of	the	resources.	
The	rest	of	 the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	section	2,	we	provide	a	 literature	review	of	
progressivity.	 Section	3	 introduces	 the	 tax‐benefit	 system	 in	Mexico	and	describes	 the	used	
data.	Section	4	shows	the	empirical	application	and	reports	the	main	findings.	We	conclude	in	
section	5	and	report	some	insights	for	future	studies.	
	
2.	The	progressive	tax/benefit	system:	a	posture	of	redistributive	analysis	
In	 recent	 years,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 discussing	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	
issues	about	the	redistributive	mechanisms	of	income.	The	role	of	the	State	is	to	improve	the	
                                                            
†	There	is	an	official	report	indicating	that	if	four	of	the	transfers	had	not	been	applied	(Oportunidades,	
elderly	and	70,	public	scholarships	and	Procampo)	2.6	million	additional	individuals	would	be	found	in	
poverty	(CONEVAL,	2009).	
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social	 welfare	 of	 population.	 This	 can	 be	 performed	 the	 usual	 through	 to	 redistributive	
mechanisms	 of	 income,	 which	 are	 the	 collection	 of	 taxes	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 benefit	
programs.	 The	 redistribution	 of	 income	 is	 regularly	 justified	 when	 failures	 occur	 in	 free	
markets.	 The	 study	 of	 progressivity	 and	 redistributive	 effect	 constitute	 a	 basic	 input	 to	
perceive	 the	 social	 efficiency	 of	 the	 fiscal	 system.	 It	 also	 allows	 having	 an	 overview	 on	 the	
shape	of	distributions	from	contributors	to	the	incidence	of	taxes	and	benefits.	
	
2.1	Empirical	studies	of	progressivity	and	evidence.	
	
Policy	recommendations	for	Latin	American	countries	have	been	focused	on	the	development	
of	 a	 tax	 structure	 that	 emphasizes	 government	 revenue	 through	 indirect	 taxes	 (Bird	 and	
Gendron,	 2011)	 which	 can	 be	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 effective	 mechanism	 for	 redistribution;	
conversely,	 this	 recommendation	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 number	 of	 distant	 scenarios.	 However,	 a	
taxation	system	with	efficiency,	pay	equity	and	 its	ability	 to	 redistribute	among	 the	various	
contributors	should	be	considered.	In	order	to	increase	revenues	and	to	cope	with	inequality,	
the	policy	maker	must	consider	if	the	tax	system	has	to	be	modified	(Musgrave,	1990).	
Since	the	seminal	work	of	Pechman	and	Okner	(1974)	for	the	United	States,	there	has	been	a	
significant	amount	of	related	research	that	has	enriched	the	original	 inquiry.	 In	this	seminal	
work,	 a	 proportional	 tax	 system	 was	 found	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 mutual	 mix	 neutralization	
induced	by	progressive	and	regressive	taxes.	More	research	of	the	topic	can	be	found	for	other	
developed	 countries	 and	 more	 recently,	 for	 some	 developing	 and	 transitional	 economies	
(Duclos	and	Tabi,	1996;	Davidson	and	Duclos,	1997;	Makdissi	and	Wodon,	2002;	Duclos,	et	al,	
2003;	 Duclos,	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Araar,	 2008;	 Kaplanoglou	 and	Newberry,	 2008;	 Bibi	 and	 Duclos,	
2010;	Bird	and	Gendron	2011;	Lustig,	et	al.	2012;	Cok,	et	al,	2012).	
For	 the	 Canadian	 case,	 Duclos	 and	 Tabi	 (1996)	 and	 Davidson	 and	 Duclos	 (1997)	 using	
microdata	 from	 the	 Canadian	 Surveys	 of	 Consumer	 and	 Finances	 assessed	 effective	
progressivity	with	 the	 Tax‐Redistributive	 approach	 (TR).	 These	 indices	 are	 based	 on	 social	
welfare	 evaluation	 and	 therefore,	 an	 effective	 progressive	 tax	 system	 in	 the	 country	 was	
found	 in	 the	 1980s	 in	 the	 former	 paper	 despite	 a	 relative	 regressive	 scheme	 for	 some	 tax	
figures	 existed	 when	 transfers	 were	 added	 in	 the	 assessment.	 In	 the	 latter	 article	 a	 more	
progressive	distribution	was	found	in	the	post‐fiscal	distribution	of	income	for	the	beginning	
of	the	1990s.	
Makdissi	 and	 Wodon	 (2002)	 settled	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 based	 on	 the	 stochastic	
dominance	approach	to	study	social	efficiency	of	the	indirect	tax	reforms.	Duclos,	et	al.	(2005)	
have	applied,	 for	 instance,	 this	approach	 to	 study	 the	 impact	of	 two	 important	programs	 in	
Mexico	(Liconsa	and	Procampo).	
Araar	 (2008)	 tries	 to	 propose	 an	 operational	 method	 to	 enable	 the	 comparison	 of	
progressivity	of	the	fiscal	systems	overtime.	He	has	performed	an	empirical	application	using	
the	Canadian	data	to	estimate	the	impact	of	fiscal	system	on	the	size	and	wellbeing	of	socio‐
economic	 classes.	 He	 concludes	 for	 the	 progressivity	 of	 the	 fiscal	 system	 that	 enables	 to	
maintain	the	size	of	poor	and	middle	classes.	
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	Kaplanoglou	 and	Newberry	 (2008)	 have	 estimated	 for	 Greece	 in	 1999	 the	 HI	 and	 Vertical	
redistribution	components	using	only	indirect	taxes	finding	that	a	less	vertical	negative	effect	
can	be	 attained	 even	when	more	HI	 is	 induced	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 and	 re‐ranking	 by	 the	
indirect	 reforms	 for	 this	 country.	 Bibi	 and	 Duclos	 (2010)	 study	 the	 poverty	 dominance	 of	
fiscal	system	for	five	developed	countries.	They	show	how	the	redistributive	effect	have	major	
impact	 on	 reducing	 poverty	 for	 Sweden,	 the	 UK	 dominates	 all	 other	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	
social	 transfers,	 but	 Canada	 emerges	 as	 the	 country	 with	 the	 greatest	 success	 on	 taxation	
avoiding	 increasing	poverty	 levels	with	 this	variable.	Also,	 in	Canada	and	Sweden	 the	social	
transfers	and	the	taxes	support	one	of	the	best	results	on	reducing	poverty.	Bird	and	Gendron	
(2011)	 establishes	 that	 there	 is	 actually	 very	 little	 evidence	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 literature	
examination	in	terms	of	tax‐benefit	incidence	for	developing	and	transitional	countries.	They	
explain	the	need	for	research	on	these	countries	to	work	on	reforms	to	reduce	HI	improving	
the	indirect	taxation.‡	
For	two	transitional	countries,	Slovenia	and	Croatia,	Cok,	et	al.	(2012)	have	performed	one	of	
the	 most	 complete	 empirical	 applications	 using	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 figures	 to	 complete	 the	
whole	fiscal	system	in	both	countries	and	obtain	a	comparison	of	the	vertical	and	horizontal	
components	 from	 the	 two	 countries.	 They	 have	 applied	 the	 DJA	 approach	 for	 Croatia	 and	
found	 that	 even	 both	 countries	 share	 a	 similar	 background	 they	 present	 different	 outputs	
from	 their	 fiscal	 systems.	They	 found	how	 the	 fiscal	 system	 in	Slovenia	has	 created	a	much	
more	 impact	on	vertical	effects	 than	 in	Croatia,	but	 for	 the	 former	country	 the	 fiscal	system	
also	 induced	much	more	 horizontal	 inequity	 when	 sensitivity	 analysis	 is	 carried	 out	 using	
greater	aversion	to	inequality	for	the	lower	tail	of	distribution.	
Lustig’s,	et	al.	(2012)	research	provides	good	insights	in	pursuing	the	progressivity	incidence	
for	 the	Mexican	 fiscal	system	figures	and	 its	 impact	on	poverty	measures	comparing	 it	with	
five	other	countries	in	Latin	America.	Using	the	concentration	approach	and	Probit	models	to	
inquire	about	mobility,	their	results	show	that	a	more	progressive	tax‐benefit	system	is	found	
for	the	sort	of	countries	in	recent	years;	Bolivia,	Mexico	and	Peru	have	the	lowest	impacts	on	
poverty	reduction,	while	Argentina,	Uruguay	and	Brazil	presented	the	greatest	reductions	and	
are	the	countries	with	the	most	redistributive	fiscal	systems.	
This	 work	 from	 Lustig	 still	 uses	 Kakwani	 (1977)	 and	 Reynolds‐Smolensky	 (1977)	
progressivity	indices,	as	well	as	concentration	curves	when	combining	total	taxes	and	benefits	
to	 obtain	 the	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 effects	 following	 the	 Lambert	 (1985)	 approach;	
unfortunately,	it	does	not	provide	in	detail	the	main	sources	from	progressivity	or	regressivity	
nor	even	the	re‐ranking	implied	in	the	process,	which	are	the	tasks	of	our	paper.	
	The	issue	of	Horizontal	Inequality	is	not	commonly	treated	as	much	as	the	Vertical	Equity	(VE)	
issue	(Duclos	and	Araar,	2006).	Huesca	and	Serrano	(2005)	explore	an	application	for	VAT	in	
Mexico.	Their	work	focuses	on	the	contribution	of	VAT	to	revenues	and	the	redistribution	of	
income	 giving	 insights	 that	 is	weakly	progressive	 and	with	 low	 fundraising	potential.	 Their	
results	indicate	that	the	Mexican	VAT	contributes	to	VE,	but	the	problem	arises	to	reduce	the	
HI	 existing	 in	 that	 country	 due	 to	 the	 exemptions	 and	 zero	 rates	 on	 food,	 books,	 public	
                                                            
‡	By	 this	 time,	Duclos,	et	al.	 (2003)	had	already	developed	a	new	fashioned	methodology	 to	estimate	
and	decompose	the	change	on	inequality	induced	from	the	vertical	equity,	HI	and	re‐ranking	in	a	fiscal	
system	using	a	non‐parametric	method	to	detect	the	“equals”	in	the	distribution.	
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transportation,	drug	medications	as	well	as	rents	for	leasing,	giving	a	low	taxable	base	for	this	
tax	figure.	
Valero‐Gil	(2002)	using	microdata	from	the	2000	year	survey	of	income	and	expenditure	for	
Mexico	 found	 that	 some	 goods	 should	 not	 be	 subsidized	 when	 considering	 low	 levels	 of	
elasticity	 on	 food	 and	medicines,	 once	 inequity	 aversion	 parameters	 have	 been	 taking	 into	
account	for	the	entire	population.	Flores	(2003)	discusses	the	Mexican	Government	proposal	
of	 an	 increase	 in	VAT	on	 food	and	 transferring	 cash	 to	 the	 lower	groups	of	 income,	 finding	
how	 the	 VAT	 increase	 would	 improve	 revenues	 and	 reduces	 inequality	 in	 less	 than	 a	
percentage	point	in	the	Gini	index.§	
Valero‐Gil	(2006)	develops	an	estimation	of	optimal	taxation	and	his	results	indicate	the	need	
for	raising	VAT	on	food	for	reasons	of	economic	efficiency,	but	for	redistribution	asserts	that	
those	products	 should	not	be	 taxed.	Vargas	 (2009)	with	a	 static	 approach	departs	 from	 the	
evolution	and	distribution	of	income	in	Mexico	for	twenty	years,	analyzing	the	tax	burden	in	
the	 country	 and	 evaluating	 the	 incidence	 of	 benefits	 generated	 by	 public	 spending.	 Using	
microdata	of	income	and	expenditure	with	the	concentration	method,	found	the	tax	system	to	
be	progressive	due	to	the	high	concentration	of	the	tax	burden	in	the	top	deciles	of	income.	
	SHCP	(2012)**	found	that	the	top	decile	of	income	in	the	Mexican	households	contributes	with	
30.6%	of	the	total	tax	payments	of	VAT	(for	the	general	rate),	enjoys	12	per	cent	for	their	zero	
rate	 expenditures	 and	 24.9	 per	 cent	 in	 exemptions,	 nearly	 37	 per	 cent	 of	 revenues	 not	
collected	 from	 these	 contributors.	 In	 this	 overview,	 it	 can	be	observed	 a	 higher	 tax	 burden	
with	more	 incidences	 for	 the	 top	 income	 levels,	but	nobody	 can	have	 the	 certainty	of	 a	 fair	
treatment	for	the	pre‐fiscal	situation	with	equal	contributors	in	the	tax	system.	
	
3.	Methodology	and	data	
	
A	 tax	 is	 found	 to	 be	 progressive	 if	 it	 burdens	 more	 the	 non‐poor	 group.	 This	 implies	 a	
decrease	 in	 inequality	 and	 a	 rise	 in	 the	 share	 for	 the	 net	 income	 in	 the	 poor	 group	 of	
households.	 In	 the	 literature	 of	 progressivity,	 there	 are	 two	 main	 distinct	 concepts	 of	
progressivity:	 the	 local	 and	 the	 global	 ones.	 In	 the	 pioneered	 work	 of	 Musgrave	 and	 Thin	
(1948)	 two	 main	 approaches	 were	 proposed	 for	 the	 measurement	 of	 local	 progressivity,	
which	are	the	liability	progression	and	residual	progression.	Kakwani	(1977)	has	addressed	a	
serious	 criticism	 to	 this	 approach	 since	 the	 latter	 looks	 only	 for	 the	 extent	 of	 local	
progressivity.	 Kakwani	 proposed	 an	 index	 of	 progressivity	 for	 taxes	 that	 is	 equal	 to	 the	
difference	between	the	concentration	index	for	the	tax	and	the	Gini	index	of	gross	income.††	
                                                            
§ Indirect	taxes	(such	as	VAT)	have	been	criticized	as	a	tool	that	affects	negatively	the	population,	in	this	
sense,	 Bird	 and	 Gendron	 (2011)	 give	 elements	 of	why	 in	 the	 real	world	 people	 keep	 the	 belief	 that	
indirect	taxes	such	as	VAT	are	regressive.	Furthermore,	they	indicate	that	a	well‐designed	VAT	may	be	
more	progressive	than	a	direct	(on	 income)	tax,	because	the	 latter	strategy	only	impacts	a	portion	of	
the	taxable	base	(Bird	and	Gendron,	2011:	75). 
**	These	results	should	be	taken	cautiously	because	its	estimation	of	the	tax‐burden	distribution	does	
not	exclude	informal	expenditures,	making	the	VAT	payments	to	be	overestimated.	
††	Duclos	and	Tabi	(1996)	report	that,	the	local	progressivity	can	induce	the	same	conclusion	of	global	
progressivity	in	the	case	where	local	progressivity	is	observed	elsewhere.	
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When	we	denote	the	inequality	index	of	gross	income	ܫ௑,	limited	to	the	interval	[0	,	1]	and	the	
index	from	the	concentration	of	any	given	tax	by	ܥሺ்ሻ	which	is	bounded	on	the	interval	[‐1,	1],	
the	formula	for	the	Kakwani	index	is	written	in	expression	(1):	
	
ܭ் ൌ ܥ் െ ܫ௑	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
ܭ்	 is	 the	Kakwani	 index	of	progressivity	of	 tax	ܶ,	 such	 technique	 is	 standard	and	has	been	applied	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 empirical	 works.	 Besides,	 the	 quantification	 method	 of	
progressivity,	a	dominance	stochastic	approach	can	also	be	used	to	take	a	judgment	about	the	
progressivity	 of	 a	 given	 tax	 (see	 Yitzhaki	 and	 Thirsk,	 1990;	 Yitzhaki	 and	 Slemrod,	 1991).	
Mainly,	 this	 exercise	 can	 easily	 be	 conducted	 by	 comparing	 between	 concentration	 and	
Lorenz	 curves.	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 present	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 used	 to	 assess	 and	
analyze	the	stochastic	dominance	progressivity	conditions.‡‡ 
	
3.1	Progressivity	curves.	
	
Progressivity	curves	are	derived	from	the	progressivity	conditions	by	comparing	between	the	
Lorenz	 curve	 of	market	 (gross)	 income	 ܮ௑ሺ݌ሻ	 and	 the	 concentration	 curve	 of	 taxes	 or	 net	
income	ܥ்/ேሺ݌ሻ.	ܶሺ݌ሻ	represents	the	tax/net	income	of	those	with	income	equal	to	ܺሺ݌ሻ.	We	
denote	 the	 progressivity	 curve	 that	 enable	 the	 comparison	 between	 the	 Lorenz	 and	
concentration	curves	at	percentile	݌	by	ܴܲሺ݌ሻ.	 In	what	follow,	we	present	the	main	rules	to	
check	the	progressivity	based	on	Lorenz	and	concentration	curves:	
	
 The	tax	T	is	Tax	Redistribution	(TR)	progressive	if		
       PR p   L p   C p 0 0,1X T p     	
 The	transfer	B	is	Tax	Redistribution	(TR)	progressive	if	:	
       PR p   C p L p 0 0,1B X p     	
 The	tax	T	is	Income	Redistribution	(IR)	progressive	if	:	
       PR p   C p L p 0 0,1X T X p     	
 The	transfer	B	is	Income	Redistribution	(IR)	progressive	if	:	
       PR p   C p L p 0 0,1X B X p     	
	
In	some	time,	 the	progressivity	conditions	are	not	checked	elsewhere.	 In	such	case,	one	can	
return	to	progressivity	indices.	
	
3.2	Decomposing	progressivity	by	tax	sources:	The	analytical	approach	
	
	As	 was	 already	 mentioned	 above,	 among	 the	 popular	 indices	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 of	
progressivity	of	a	given	 tax	 it	can	be	used	the	Kakwani	 index.	By	construction,	 the	Kakwani	
index	is	based	on	the	scheme	of	distribution	of	tax	(Tax	Redistribution)	to	capture	the	extent	
                                                            
‡‡	Precisely,	we	are	concerned	by	the	second	order	inequality	dominance.	For	more	insights	related	to	
taxes	and	benefits	see	Davidson	and	Duclos	(1997).	
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of	 progressivity	 and	 other	 indices	 are	 based	 on	 the	 scheme	 of	 net	 incomes	 (Income	
Redistribution)	to	assess	the	level	of	progressivity,	as	is	the	case	for	the	Reynolds‐Smolensky	
(1977)	progressivity	index	(Davidson	and	Duclos,	1997).		
Some	 taxes,	 like	 VAT,	 are	 composed	 from	different	 sources	 of	 tax.	More	 important,	 a	 given	
source	of	 tax	 can	 comprise	 a	higher	 level	 of	progressivity	 compared	 to	 another.	How	 is	 the	
extent	 of	 progressivity	 for	 each	 source	 of	 tax	 and	 how	 is	 its	 contribution	 to	 total	
progressivity?	The	same	questions	can	be	applied	to	benefits.	In	what	follow,	we	propose	an	
analytical	form	of	decomposition	for	some	popular	progressivity	indices.	Assume	that	the	tax	
ܶ	 is	 composed	 from	ܭ	 tax	 sources.	We	denote	 the	 tax	 source	 ݇	by	 ௞ܶ	 such	 as	ܶ ൌ ∑ ௞ܶ	௄௞ୀଵ .	
Also,	 we	 denote	 the	 average	 tax	 ܶ		 by	 ߤ் 	 and	 that	 of	 ௞ܶ	 by	 ߤ்௞.	 Formally,	 the	 natural	
decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index	 of	 progressivity	 that	 we	 propose	 takes	 the	 following	
form:	
	
்ܴܶ ൌ ∑ ఓ೅ೖ	ఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ	
௄௞ୀଵ 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	
From	 the	 formula	 (2)	 we	 remark	 that	 when	 the	 tax	 sources	 are	 considered	 likewise	 as	 in	
income	sources,	the	output	turns	in	part	to	a	decomposition	of	inequality	by	income	sources	
(see	Rao,	1969	and	Araar,	2006).	It	is	helpful	to	recall	that	Kakwani	(1977)	has	already	tried	
to	 show	 how	 its	 index	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 different	 tax	 sources.	 Mainly,	 his	 proposed	
decomposition	 weighs	 the	 progressivity	 indices	 of	 tax	 sources	 by	 the	 ratio	 between	 the	
average	tax	rate	from	the	tax	sources	and	that	of	the	total	taxes.			
Starting	 from	 this	 form	 of	 decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index,	 a	 set	 of	 interesting	
conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 contribution	 of	 a	 given	 tax	 ܶ݇	 by	 its	
component:		ఓ೅ೖ	ఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ	:	
 The	 contribution	 of	 a	 given	 tax	 to	 the	 progressivity	 of	 total	 taxes	 depends	 on	 the	
importance	of	its	share	ሺߤ்௞/	ߤ்ሻ.	Of	course,	when	the	average	of	the	tax	is	very	low,	
the	contribution	of	the	later	to	the	total	progressivity	must	be	low	even	if	it	shows	a	
higher	level	of	progressivity.	
 The	contribution	of	a	given	tax	to	the	progressivity	of	total	taxes	depends	also	on	its	
own	level	of	progressivityሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ.	
Besides	 the	 proposed	 decomposition	 of	 the	 Kakwani	 index,	 we	 propose	 also	 the	
decomposition			Reynolds‐Smolensky	(1977)	index	as	follows:	
	
ܫ்ܴ ൌ ∑ ఓ೅ೖ		ఓ೉ିఓ೅ ሺܥ்௞ െ ܩ௑ሻ
௄௞ୀଵ 		 	 	 (3)	
	
It	is	evident	that	the	relative	contribution	of	taxes	to	the	total	progressivity	will	be	the	same	
for	 the	 proposed	 decompositions	 of	 Kakwani	 and	 Reynolds‐Smolensky	 indices	 of	
progressivity	 and	 will	 add	 up	 to	 one.	 Further,	 these	 decompositions	 are	 relevant	 because	
when	we	observe	 a	 low	 level	 of	 progressivity	 for	 any	 tax,	 like	VAT	 for	 instance,	we	 cannot	
easily	determine	the	source	of	this	low	level	of	progressivity.	This	decomposition	will	provide	
more	 insights	 about	 knowing,	 at	 first	 hand,	 what	 are	 the	 tax	 (or	 benefit)	 sources	 that	
contribute	the	most	to	the	total	progressivity.	
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3.3	Vertical	and	horizontal	inequity	of	the	tax‐benefit	system	(DJA	model).	
	
“Equals	must	be	treated	equally”	an	ethical	value	which	is	easily	defendable.	By	HI	we	would	
like	to	show	the	extent	of	unequally	tax	treatment	of	equals	(those	that	have	the	same	level	of	
gross	income).	By	reranking	(R)	we	refer	to	the	impact	of	change	in	gross	income	rank	caused	
by	the	tax/benefit	system.	By	the	term	VE,	we	refer	to	the	impact	of	a	tax/benefit	system	on	
inequality	where	equals	are	treated	equally.	Duclos	et	al.	(2003)	have	proposed	a	nice	method	
to	decompose	the	redistribution	effect	or	change	 in	 inequality	 into	 these	 three	components.	
With	 this	 application,	 we	 can	 decompose	 the	 difference	 between	 gross	 income	 X,	 and	 net	
income	N	inequalities	as	written	in	the	formula	(4):	
	
∆ܫሺߝ, ߩሻ ൌ ܫ௑ െ ܫோᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ	െ	ሺܫே௉ െ ܫோሻ			ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥെ 			ሺܫே െ ܫே௉ሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ	 	 	 (4)	
VE	 	 HI	 	 R	
Where	 ܫሺߝ, ߩሻ	 is	 the	 Gini‐Atkinson	 index	 (Araar	 and	 Duclos,	 2003).	 PNI 	 stands	 for	 the	
coefficient	of	concentration	of	N	when	the	ranking	variable	is	X(p)	and	ܫோ	as	the	concentration	
index	of	purged	net	 income	 from	 local	 inequality	 (we	assume	 that	each	 individual	have	 the	
expected	 value	 of	 net	 income	 according	 to	 the	 level	 of	 his	 gross	 income).	 Let	 us	 explaining	
how	each	of	the	three	components	captures	the	extent	of	what	they	are	proposed	to	assess:	
 Horizontal	 inequity	 (ܫே௉ െ ܫோᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ):	 In	 the	 case	 where	 there	 is	 no	 local	 inequality	 in	 net	
incomes,		we	have	that	,	ܫே௉ ൌ ܫோ	and	the	horizontal	inequality	is	nil.	The	more	the	local	
inequality	 of	 net	 incomes	 at	 percentile	 p ,	 the	 lower	 is	 the	 local	 social	 welfare	 (
( | ( )) N X Q p )	and	the	higher	is	ܫே௉	and	then	the	component	Horizontal	inequity.	
 Re‐ranking	 (ܫே െ ܫே௉ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ):	In	the	case	where	the	rank	based	on	gross	income	is	similar	to	
that	based	on	net	incomes,	we	have	then:	ܫே ൌ ܫே௉	and	the	re‐ranking	component	is	nil.	
The	 more	 the	 re‐ranking	 the	 lower	 is	 ܫே௉	 ,	 and	 then,	 the	 higher	 is	 the	 re‐ranking	
component.		
 Vertical	 Equity	 (ܫ௑ െ ܫோᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ):	 This	 component	 captures	 the	 change	 in	 inequality	 after	
removing	the	cost	of	horizontal	inequality.	The	more	the	tax/benefit	system	equalizes	
net	income,	the	higher	is	the	vertical	equity.		
	
3.4	Mexican	database	of	ENIGH	2012.	
	
For	the	empirical	exercise	the	2012	ENIGH	is	used	as	the	most	recent	data	at	the	moment	of	
this	research,	with	a	sample	of	9,007	households	and	about	31	million	expanded.	Based	on	the	
information	provided	by	its	microdata	we	proceed	to	build	the	distribution	according	to	per	
capita	units	of	income	following	both,	direct	and	indirect	identification	methods	(Lustig,	et	al.	
2012:	 8).	 Once	 disposable	 household	 income	 (denoted	 by	 N)	 is	 obtained,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
calculate	the	figures	shown	in	table	1	to	rebuild	the	pre‐fiscal	(Market	income)	denoted	by	X.	
	When	the	vector	on	N	is	obtained	after	taxes,	the	current	tax	rules	per	each	source	of	income	
are	applied.	Thus,	different	tax	brackets	were	taken	into	account	for	the	taxpayers,	tax	credits	
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and	tax	allowances	per	wage‐earners	were	used	as	well.	In	order	to	rebuild	the	fiscal	system	
from	N	 in	the	surveys	the	tax	translation	hypothesis	in	Pechman	(1985)	are	considered.	For	
the	 empirical	 exercise,	we	use	 the	 income	 tax	 from	both	wage‐earners	 and	 individuals	 that	
reported	income	sources	as	benefits	obtained	from	business,	so	we	are	able	of	estimating	the	
progressivity	and	incidence	for	these	sorts	of	direct	taxes	in	the	survey.	For	the	indirect	taxes	
we	estimate	VAT	and	special	tax	on	goods	and	services	(IEPS)	according	to	the	tax	rules,	those	
controlled	 by	 informal	 activities	 related	 to	 the	 place	 of	 purchase	 provided	 by	 the	 same	
survey.§§	
	The	border	with	the	United	States	(US)	has	a	special	VAT	treatment	different	from	the	rest	of	
the	 country	 in	 the	 year	 2012,	 so	 this	 has	 been	 controlled	 as	well	 applying	 the	 11%	 to	 the	
expenditures	located	in	all	these	cities	included	in	the	survey.	We	believe	this	process	do	not	
add	taxes	beyond	the	actual	paid	by	taxpayers.	
	In	the	case	of	benefits	we	collect	them	at	the	household	level	from	the	same	survey	using	the	
following:	 scholarships	 and	 cash	 transfers	 for	 education,	 Oportunidades	 social	 assistance	
program,	70	and	more	(for	the	elderly	without	pension);	Programa	de	Apoyo	Alimentario	(PAL,	
program	for	food	assistance);	transfer	for	temporary	employment;	and	finally,	other	assistance	
programs.***	At	the	end,	market	income	is	estimated	just	adding	the	total	taxes,	pensions	and	
federal	 contributions	 from	 wages	 to	 the	 social	 security	 system	 (SSC)	 minus	 the	 transfers	
received	per	household	as	follows:	
	
ܺ ൌ ܰ ൅ ܶ െ ܲ ൅ ܵܵܥ െ ܤ																		 	 	 (5)	
	
where	X	stands	for	the	market	income,	N	as	the	post‐fiscal	income,	T	as	the	tax	burden,	P	the	
pensions,	SSC	as	the	social	security	contributions	and	B	are	the	benefits	(See	table	2).	We	do	
not	 consider	 transfers	 at	 a	more	 aggregated	 level	 such	 as	 public	 education	 or	 health	 care,	
since	our	purpose	is	to	determine	progressivity	 isolated	from	the	taxes	paid	as	well	as	from	
the	benefits	received	directly	 in	a	microeconomic	perspective.	Also	 for	 indirect	 taxes,	we	do	
not	use	a	system	of	demand	elasticity	estimation	to	assess	the	marginal	economic	efficiency	of	
various	sources	of	tax	payments	as	the	analysis	focus	on	a	static	comparative	framework.	
Table	1.	Tax	and	benefit	system	in	Mexico.	
Taxes	a	 Indicators
ISR	 ‐Income	tax
VAT	 ‐Value	added	tax
IEPS	 ‐Special	consumption	tax
Employer’s	social	security	contributions	 ‐For	health	insurance
‐For	pensions	
‐For	housing	(public	lending	to	finance	a	house)	
Employees’	social	security	contributions	 ‐For	health	insurance
                                                            
§§	We	have	 considered	 the	15	different	places	where	at	 least	 five	do	not	 collect	VAT	or	 IEPS.	 	Those	
places	not	contributing	 for	 indirect	 taxes	are	Flea	markets	and	street	vendors,	purchases	outside	 the	
country,	 others	 known	 as	 “loncherías,	 fondas,	 torterías”	 as	 informal	 cafeterias,	 taquerias	 or	 street	
dinning	places,	Canteens	or	 informal	bars	(Pulquerías	in	spanish),	and	last	but	not	 least,	 the	informal	
freelance	vendors	not	officially	registered	according	to	the	survey.	
***	 Just	 as	 the	 research	 of	 Dok,	 et	 al	 (2012)	 and	 Lustig,	 et	 al	 (2012)	 we	 do	 not	 add	 retirement	 and	
pensions	 as	 a	 benefit	 component	 because	 of	 its	 contributive	 nature,	 but	 this	 is	 included	 in	 the	 net	
income	figure. 
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‐For	pensions
‐For	housing	(public	lending	to	finance	a	house)	
Benefits	b	
Means‐tested	 ‐Oportunidades
	 ‐Elderly
	 ‐Program	for	food	support
	 ‐Scholarships
	 ‐Procampo
	 ‐Unemployment	assistance	(Temporal	Employment)	
Non‐means‐tested	 ‐Pensions	(Not	included	in	benefits,	but	included	in	net	income)
	 ‐Others	(Are	transfers	from	unknown	source	in	the	survey)	
Notes:		 a	Obtained	by	using	simulation	methods.	
	 b	Obtained	by	using	direct	identification	methods.	
Source:	Own	classification	based	on	administrative	sources.	
	
4.	Empirical	application		
	
In	this	section,	we	start	by	analyzing	the	incidence	from	the	tax‐benefit	data	with	descriptive	
statistics	 to	move	on	 the	next	 section	 for	 evaluating	 the	 tax‐benefit	 system	and	applied	 the	
proposal	methodology	previously	described.	
	
4.1	Pattern	of	taxes	and	benefits	by	quintiles	
	
Departing	 from	 Table	 2	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 a	 process	 of	 redistribution	 going	 from	 the	 market	
income	 to	 the	net	one	 in	 favor	 to	 the	 lowest	 two	quintiles	of	 the	population.	The	shares	on	
totals	for	the	first	three	quintiles	increased	significantly	but	just	quintiles	two	and	three	show	
higher	averages	on	income	after	taxes	and	benefits.	
	Average	income	is	greater	in	richer	quintiles	but	decreases	when	moving	from	market	to	net	
income	in	the	third,	fourth	and	the	top	respectively;	however,	the	income	shares	on	totals	are	
too	low	for	the	first	two	quintiles.	In	the	case	of	taxes	and	total	benefits	a	lower	tax	burden	for	
the	first	quintile	(poorest)	is	also	observed,	whereas	from	the	second	quintile	upwards	the	net	
effect	of	paying	taxes	is	much	higher	and	at	first	sight,	this	is	much	greater	and	progressive	for	
the	higher	quintiles.	Summarizing,	 redistribution	 is	observed	 for	 the	 lowest	quintiles	with	a	
net	tax	burden	that	rises	rapidly	from	the	third	quintile	than	social	benefits	cannot	seemingly	
offset.	
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Table	2.	Shares	and	means	(by	population	quintiles)	of	gross	and	net	incomes,		
taxes	and	transfers	per	capita	in	Mexico,	2012	
(Shares	in	%	and	means	in	pesos)	
Market	income	 Net	income	 Total	taxes	 Total	benefits	 Pension	 SSC	
Quintile	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean Share Mean Share Mean Share	 Mean	 Share Mean
1	 2.84	 487.21	 4.97	 796.65 2.38 51.63 41.13 133.56 23.03	 229.00	 0.45 1.50
2	 7.01	 1207.88	 7.99	 1,281.12 4.92 106.54 22.85 74.07 11.49	 114.14	 2.51 8.43
3	 11.62	 2004.95	 12.28	 1970.48 8.95 193.84 13.58 43.93 13.73	 136.65	 6.32 21.21
4	 19.29	 3323.73	 19.24	 3090.79 18.04 390.68 13.16 42.71 16.58	 165.04	 14.95 50.00
5	 59.24	 10232.93	 55.71	 8940.59 65.52 1420.59 9.38 30.47 35.39	 352.18	 75.81 254.40
Total	 100.00	 3450.46	 100.00	 3215.19 100.00 432.53 100.00 64.95 100.00	 199.38	 100.00 67.08
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
For	 the	 case	 of	 taxes	 and	 its	 burden	 on	 the	 population	 distribution,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 an	
apparent	 progressivity	 is	 due	 to	 direct	 taxes	 on	 income	 (ISR),	which	 could	 be	 offset	 by	 the	
VAT	payments.	It	can	be	seen	in	Table	3	how	VAT	shows	a	greater	burden	as	well	as	a	higher	
mean	on	payments	for	the	first	quintile.	The	poorest	quintile	contributes	with	a	share	of	3.5	
per	 cent	 and	 the	 second	 with	 6.6	 per	 cent,	 and	 their	 mean	 of	 this	 tax	 is	 higher	 than	 the	
corresponding	for	the	ISR,	with	$27.6	and	$52.5	pesos	per	capita.	The	remaining	shares	and	
means	for	IEPS	and	SSC	are	less	evident	and	show	certain	progressivity	along	the	quintiles.	
	
Table	3.	Shares	and	means	(by	population	quintiles)	of	income	and	indirect	taxes	
and	Social	contributions	per	capita	in	Mexico,	2012	(Shares	in	%	and	means	in	pesos)	
Income	tax		 VAT	 IEPS	 SSC	
Quintile	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	 Share	 Mean	
1	 1.65	 18.80	 3.50 27.60 2.26 5.22 0.45	 1.50
2	 3.91	 44.57	 6.63 52.49 4.09 9.48 2.51	 8.43
3	 7.47	 84.94	 10.83 85.49 10.11 23.41 6.32	 21.21
4	 16.78	 191.22	 19.34 152.57 20.19 46.89 14.95	 50.00
5	 70.11	 800.89	 59.67 473.54 63.21 146.16 75.81	 254.40
Total	 100.00	 228.01	 100.00 158.30 100.00 46.22 100.00	 67.08
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
		Table	 4	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 benefits	 for	 all	 the	 quintiles	 by	 social	 program	
expenditure.	 It	 can	 be	 perceived	 how	 the	 most	 redistributive	 benefit	 comes	 from	
Oportunidades,	 where	 the	 lowest	 two	 quintiles	 have	 a	 share	more	 than	 76	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
amount	 spent	 by	 this	 program;	 in	 addition,	 the	 benefit	 shares	 are	 also	 high	 for	 the	 elderly	
program	with	 a	 share	 of	 66	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 same	 quintiles.	 Meanwhile,	 73	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
transfers	from	PAL	program	is	the	share	for	the	lowest	two	quintiles,	being	this	benefit	one	of	
the	 transfer	 that	 goes	 to	 the	 most	 disadvantaged	 due	 to	 its	 inherent	 characteristics	 of	
operation	rules	on	food	needs,	but	in	absolute	terms	is	one	of	the	lowest	benefit	in	per	capita	
units	of	income.	The	benefits	that	concentrate	little	more	than	60	per	cent	for	the	lower	two	
quintiles	 are	Procampo	 and	 the	 temporary	 employment.	 Procampo	 needs	 to	 be	 highlighted,	
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when	25	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 cash‐transfers	went	 to	 the	 top	 quintiles	 as	well	 as	 the	 scholarship	
program	with	over	60	per	cent	of	the	benefits.	
	
Table	4.	Shares	and	means	(by	population	quintiles)	of	benefits	per	capita	in	Mexico,	2012	
(Shares	in	%	and	means	in	per	capita	Mexican	pesos)	
quintiles	 oportunidades	 Elderly	 PAL	 School	 Procampo	 Emp.	temp	 Others	
	 	 Shares 	
1	 50.69	 44.07 47.51 9.37 35.18 43.86	 28.01
2	 25.96	 22.13 25.69 12.47 25.03 17.22	 16.13
3	 13.07	 12.60 5.85 17.33 14.42 9.19	 12.66
4	 7.92	 10.20 16.96 37.97 9.52 28.18	 19.91
5	 2.20	 11.27 4.05 22.96 15.69 1.69	 23.38
Total	 100.00	 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00	 100.00
quintiles	 Means	
1	 79.85	 28.86 1.66 3.70 13.31 0.90	 5.27
2	 40.89	 14.48 0.90 4.93 9.47 0.35	 3.04
3	 20.61	 8.24 0.20 6.83 5.47 0.19	 2.39
4	 12.49	 6.69 0.59 15.00 3.60 0.58	 3.75
5	 3.47	 7.38 0.14 9.07 5.95 0.03	 4.42
Total	 31.47	 13.13 0.70 7.91 7.56 0.41	 3.77
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
4.2	Incidence	and	coverage	of	taxes	and	benefits.	
	
From	the	Table	5	it	can	be	seen	the	coverage	rate	of	benefits.	The	greatest	coverage	is	attained	
by	Oportunidades	program,	where	the	poorest	first	quintile	receives	about	51	per	cent	and	the	
second	 28	 per	 cent.	 This	 shows	 how	 this	 program	 targets	 well	 the	 poor	 group.	 The	 next	
important	 benefits	 according	 to	 its	 population	 coverage	 are	 the	 Elderly	 program	 and	 the	
Scholarships,	with	almost	7	and	6	per	cent	respectively.		
	
Table	5.	Coverage	of	the	benefits	by	population	quintiles	in	Mexico,	2012	
(Coverage	in	%)	
Benefits	 1	 2 3 4 5	 subtotal
Oportunidades	 50.97	 28.01 14.75 8.09 2.97	 20.96
Elderly	 12.95	 8.42 5.13 4.80 3.41	 6.94
PAL	 2.33	 1.20 0.47 0.72 0.22	 0.99
Scholarship	 4.17	 4.52 6.53 7.54 5.49	 5.65
Procampo	 10.59	 5.31 3.79 2.31 0.94	 4.59
Temp.	Emp.	 0.65	 0.36 0.22 0.48 0.06	 0.35
Others	 3.81	 1.84 2.12 1.91 1.11	 2.16
*\Population	 67.13	 44.89 30.78 22.17 13.14	 36.35
*\	Population	with	at	least	one	benefit	program.	
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
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The	elderly	benefit	is	among	the	programs	with	large	coverage	for	the	poorest	quintile;	while	
scholarships	for	education	cover	more	than	7	per	cent	in	the	fourth	quintile.	Considering	the	
average	benefit	 for	 the	 top	quintles	 (Table	4)	suggests	 that	 these	 latter	 transfers	 tend	 to	be	
regressive.	The	program	with	the	 largest	coverage	for	the	poorest	quintile	 is	Oportunidades,	
followed	by	Elderly	 program,	Procampo,	 educational	 scholarships	and	other	 transfers	at	 the	
final	 coverage	position;	while	 for	 the	richest	quintile,	 scholarships	are	 located	at	 first	place,	
followed	the	Elderly	and	Oportunidades	programs,	being	the	rest	of	 the	benefits	almost	non‐
existent	for	this	quintile.	
	
4.3	General	impact	in	the	fiscal	system:	VE	and	HI	‐Application	of	DJA‐	
	
In	order	to	determine	the	overall	effect	for	the	tax‐benefit	system	on	inequality	and	to	show	
the	different	distributive	components	we	use	the	DJA	model.	As	it	can	be	observed	from	table	
6,	 the	 vertical	 equity	 component	 of	 the	 tax/benefit	 system	 is	 important	 and	 reacts	 with	 a	
decrease	of	about	16.5%	of	the	Gin‐Atkinson	index	of	inequality.	However,	the	HI	reduces	the	
VE	by	about	25%,	which	is	in	our	view	relatively	huge.	The	same	feature	is	observed	for	the	
re‐ranking	 component.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 that	 benefits	 induces	 part	 of	 the	 positive	
redistributive	effects	with	7.2	points	of	VE	and	HI	reduces	its	impact	in	a	lesser	extent	(10.5	
per	cent).	
		
Table	6.	DJA	decomposition	of	vertical	and	horizontal	equity	in	the	fiscal	system,	Mexico	2012.	
Component	 Notation	 Joint	
estimation
Share/* from	
Benefits
Share/*	 from	
Taxes	
Share/*
Inequality	in	gross	income	 ܫ௑ሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.6366 100.0 0.6366 100	 0.6366 100
Inequality	in	net	income	 ܫேሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5798 0.5999 	 0.6305
Concentration	index	of	net	
income	
ܫே௉ሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5655 0.5981 	 0.6292
Concentration	index	of	purged		
net	income	
ܫோሺߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2ሻ	 0.5412 0.5937 	 0.6265
Redistributive	effect:	 ∆ࡵሺࢿ, ࣋ሻ	 0.0567 0.0367 	 0.0061
Vertical	equity		 V: ܫ௑ െ ܫோ 0.0954 16.5 0.0429 7.2	 0.0101 1.6
Horizontal	inequity	 H:	ሺܫே௉ െ ܫோሻ 0.0244 25.6 0.0045 10.5	 0.0027 26.7
Re‐ranking	 R:	ሺܫே െ ܫே௉ሻ 0.0143 14.9 0.0018 4.2	 0.0013 12.8
/*	V/ܫே	;	H/V,	and	R/V.	
Source:	Author’s	estimation	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
As	 the	 total	Tax	component	 just	produces	a	 slightly	contribution	 to	VE	 (1.6	per	cent)	and	a	
high	level	of	HI	(reduction	on	VE)	for	about	27	per	cent	as	well	as	a	great	level	of	negative	re‐
ranking	 (12.8	per	cent),	 it	may	be	appropriate	 to	 look	 for	 the	benefit	 components	 to	detect	
which	transfer	contribute	(or	not)	to	decrease	HI	and	re‐ranking	the	most.	These	results	can	
be	 compared	 to	 those	 found	 for	 Slovenia	 and	 Croatia	 in	 Cok	 et	 al,	 (2012)	 using	 same	
parameters	for	the	Gini‐Atkinson	index	as	a	moderate	situation	(ߝ ൌ 0.5, ߩ ൌ 2)	to	measure	the	
corresponding	components.	 Initial	 inequality	 is	0.428	and	0.467	respectively	 in	each	foreign	
country	and	redistribution	is	much	greater	in	both	countries	than	in	Mexico,	with	a	difference	
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∆ࡵሺࢿ, ࣋ሻ	above	10	points	for	each	country,	having	a	reduced	reranking	in	Croatia,	however,	the	
post‐fiscal	 inequality	was	much	greater	 in	Mexico,	where	redistribution	barely	achieved	5.6	
points	of	reduction.	
It	is	helpful	to	recall	here	that	the	apparent	low	vertical	equity	with	tax	system	is	expected	in	
the	 case	where	 the	 progressivity	 and	 change	 in	 income	with	 the	 tax	 system	 affects	mainly	
those	in	the	top	of	the	distribution.	In	table	7	we	provide	a	series	of	simulations	when	adding	
each	 benefit	 to	 the	 pre‐fiscal	 income,	 one	 at	 a	 time	 to	 capture	 in	 a	 more	 detail	 its	
redistributive	effects.	It	can	be	seen	that	Oportunidades	program	induces	more	redistributive	
effects	 than	 the	 rest	of	 the	benefits	with	VE	component	near	 to	4.4	per	 cent,	meanwhile	HI	
accounts	for	7.8	per	cent	and	Reranking	as	few	as	2.2	per	cent.	
	
Table	7.	Simulations	for	DJA	decomposition	of	vertical	and	horizontal	equity		
with	benefits,	Mexico	2012.	
Component	 scholarships	 Oportunidades procampo elderly	 Pal	 empleo	 others
Inequality	in	gross	
income	 0.6366	 0.6366 0.6366 0.6366 0.6366	 0.6366	 0.6366
Inequality	in	net	income	 0.6360	 0.6126 0.6321 0.6285 0.6362	 0.6361	 0.6355
Concentration	index	of	
net	income	 0.6359	 0.6120 0.6318 0.6281 0.6362	 0.6361	 0.6354
Concentration	index	of	
purged		net	income	 0.6355	 0.6098 0.6301 0.6247 0.6359	 0.6357	 0.6348
Impact	of	simulations	
VE	 0.0010	 0.0268 0.0065 0.0119 0.0006	 0.0009	 0.0018
HI	 0.0004	 0.0021 0.0017 0.0034 0.0002	 0.0004	 0.0006
R	 0.0001	 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0001
Redistributive	effect:	
∆ࡵሺࢿ, ࣋ሻ	 0.0006	 0.0240 0.0044 0.0080 0.0004	 0.0005	 0.0011
Source:	Author’s	estimation	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
Among	the	reasons	of	 the	high	 level	of	horizontal	 inequality	are	 the	 two	conventional	error	
types	 of	 targeting	 of	 the	 benefit	 programs.	 In	 figure	 1	 we	 depict	 the	 conditional	 standard	
deviation	 using	 non‐parametric	 regression	 from	 the	 benefits.	 This	 enables	 to	 give	 the	
importance	of	 local	 inequality	of	 the	studied	benefits.	When	we	 focus	on	 the	bottom	part	of	
the	 distribution,	 the	 elderly	 and	 opportunidades	 programs	 are	 the	 ones	 which	 exhibit	 the	
highest	variability’s.	This	result	is	conforming	from	what	is	reported	in	Table	6	and	where	the	
HI	component	is	high	in	margin	with	these	programs.								
Figure	2	presents	the	expected	net	income	after	the	fiscal	system	has	acted.	The	dots	are	the	
post‐fiscal	of	sample	income	units	expressed	in	Mexican	pesos	per	capita.	It	can	be	observed	
that	for	each	market	income	(X)	in	the	top	part	of	the	distribution	a	large	amount	of	units	of	
post‐fiscal	incomes	are	located	below	the	45°	line	which	corroborates	the	progressivity	in	the	
fiscal	system.	Vertical	and	horizontal	lines	show	the	level	of	the	official	poverty	thresholds	and	
these	 are	 helpful	 to	 depict	 the	 effect	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 incomes.	 Table	 A1	 in	 the	
appendix	shows	the	poverty	levels	in	the	country	and	for	each	province.	
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Figure	1.	Conditional	standard	deviation	for	transfers,	México	2012	
(Mexican	pesos,	3rd	quarterly)	
	 	Figure	2.	Scattergram	of	pre	and	post‐fiscal	incomes,	México	2012	
(Mexican	pesos,	3rd	quarterly)	
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	These	lines	separate	four	areas:	
	
 Below	and	to	the	left	of	 the	thresholds	(panel	A)	the	poor	and	the	households	more	
affected	 by	 redistribution,	 since	 they	 represent	 around	 one	 half	 of	 the	 entire	
population	(CONEVAL,	2009)	and	most	of	them	are	located	well	below	the	expected	
net	income;		
 Below	and	 to	 the	 right	 area	 (Panel	B)	are	 individuals	who	were	not	poor,	but	 their	
income	level	was	reduced	by	the	tax	system	and	the	post‐fiscal	situation	push	them	to	
fell	in	poverty.	This	is	explained	inter	alias	by	the	HI	component;		
 Left	upper	area	(panel	C)	shows	the	slight	cloud	for	data	of	persons	who	ceased	to	be	
poor	when	they	have	seen	increasing	their	post‐fiscal	income,	which	by	the	way,	are	
some	few	(poverty	gap	may	exhibit	more	improvement	with	the	fiscal	system).		
 The	top	right	side	(Panel	D)	which	allows	to	observe	the	level	of	inequality	caused	by	
the	tax	system	in	the	case	of	 individuals	with	 incomes	much	higher	 in	the	pre‐fiscal	
situation	(Reranking).	It	seems	that	income	in	panel	D	grew	much	more	in	the	post‐
fiscal	position	with	the	cloud	of	data	above	the	estimated	curve	for	N,	and	those	who	
progressively	for	the	system	have	seen	a	decrease	on	their	income	as	part	of	a	greater	
burden	of	the	taxes	and	a	lower	incidence	of	the	transfers	for	themselves.	
	
4.3.1	The	Progressivity	of	total	taxes	and	total	benefits.	
	
Figure	3	and	4	show	how	the	fiscal	system	seems	to	be	progressive.	The	concentration	curve	
(on	 the	 left	 side)	 for	 total	 taxes	 is	elsewhere	below	the	market	 income’s	Lorenz	curve.	This	
confirms	the	progressivity	that	the	tax	system.	This	is	also	the	case	for	total	benefits,	where	its	
concentration	curve	is	elsewhere	above	the	Lorenz	curve.	For	the	net	effect	of	the	tax/benefit	
system,	we	find	that	the	latter	is	IR	progressive,	since	the	concentration	curve	of	net	incomes	
is	above	the	Lorenz	curve	of	gross	incomes.	
	
	
Figure	3.	Progressivity	of	taxes	and	
transfers:	Mexico	2012	
Figure	4.	Progressivity	curve	of	the	Tax‐benefit	
system	in	Mexico,	2012	
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4.4	Progressivity	for	the	tax‐benefit	system:	Taxes	vs	transfers.	
	
Are	 total	 benefits	 more	 progressive	 than	 total	 taxes?	 As	 we	 can	 observe	 in	 Figure	 4	 total	
benefits	 are	 more	 progressive	 than	 total	 taxes	 in	 Mexico.	 This	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	
generous	programs	of	transfers	that	target	in	priority	the	poorer	groups,	but	it	is	important	to	
recall	that	progressivity	measures	the	incidence	from	benefits	according	to	the	position	of	the	
individuals	or	families	already	involved	in	the	programs	as	well	as	considering	its	tax	burden	
in	the	system.	So,	we	assume	that	income	revenues	and	revealed	preferences	from	recipients	
and	contributors	are	already	given.	
	
4.4.1	Progressivity	in	detail	of	taxes	and	transfers	
	
In	order	to	capture	the	effects	in	the	fiscal	system	we	estimate	progressivity	curves	for	each	
tax	and	benefit	(see	figure	5	and	6).	In	the	case	of	direct	and	indirect	taxes	it	can	be	checked	
that	income	tax	is	more	progressive,	while	the	VAT	presents	a	neglected	level	of	regressivity.	
Using	the	Tax‐Redistributive	approach	–TR–	(Duclos	and	Araar,	2006)	it	can	be	seen	a	greater	
progressivity	for	direct	taxes	and	a	greater	incidence	for	the	highest	tax‐payers	(figure	5).	The	
fact	 that	 the	 TR	 approach	 presents	 greater	 progressivity	 is	 the	 result	 that	 it	 burdens	 on	
taxpayer	 segments	 composed	 by	 individuals	with	more	 economic	 capacity;	meanwhile,	 the	
VAT	 incidence	affects	more	 the	 lower	percentiles,	 reducing	 the	burden	 for	 the	middle	 ‐	and	
high‐	income	households.		
	
Table	8.	Kakwani	index	for	pre‐fiscal	and	post‐fiscal	figures,	Mexico	2012.	
Variables	 Gini_X	 Conc_N	 KT/B	 std.	Error	
Reynolds‐Smolensky	 0.5521 0.5183 0.0338 0.0020	
Taxes	 C(Ti,	Bi)	
Total	Taxes	 0.5521 0.6210 0.0689 0.0061	
ISR	 0.5521 0.6717 0.1196 0.0093	
VAT	 0.5521 0.	5498 ‐0.0023 0.0108	
IEPS	 0.5521 0.5987 0.0466 0.0116	
Social	security	contrib	 0.5521 0.7279 0.1758 0.0141	
Total	Benefits	
B	(without	pensions)	 0.5521 ‐0.3004 0.8525 0.0234	
Oportunidades	 0.5521 ‐0.4660 1.0181 0.0163	
Elderly	 0.5521 ‐0.3342 0.8863 0.0345	
PAL	 0.5521 ‐0.3968 0.9489 0.0867	
Scholarship	 0.5521 0.2185 0.3336 0.0457	
Procampo	 0.5521 ‐0.2265 0.7786 0.0598	
Temp.	Emp.	 0.5521 ‐0.3497 0.9018 0.1691	
Others	 0.5521 0.0024 0.5497 0.1132	
Pensions	 0.5521 0.1166 0.4355 0.0490	
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
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In	 the	 case	 of	 special	 duties	 to	 products	 and	 services,	 progressivity	 is	 presented	 and	 some	
relative	 regressivity	 occurs	 for	 the	 highest	 percentiles.	 The	 progressivity	 curves	 for	 the	
benefits	are	shown	in	figure	4	as	well.	It	can	be	seen	how	all	the	benefits	are	progressive	but	
those	have	different	intensity.	If	we	rank	the	transfers	from	the	more	progressive	to	the	least	
one	 (see	 also	 Table	 8),	 we	 put	 at	 first	 order	 Oportunidades,	 followed	 by	 temporary	
employment,	and	PAL	as	 the	 three	benefits	having	the	greatest	progression.	Elderly	benefits	
go	for	the	fourth	place,	leaving	the	fifth	to	Procampo,	the	sixth	to	other	transfers	and	the	last	
place	to	Scholarships.	
	
Figure	5.	Progressivity	curves	of	the	taxes	in	
Mexico,	2012	
Figure	6.	Progressivity	curves	of	the	benefits	in	
Mexico,	2012			
	 	
The	 previous	 analysis	 on	 progressivity	 of	 taxes	 and	 benefits	 can	 lead	 us	 a	 good	 way	 of	
elaborating	policy	and	recommendations	to	improve	the	effects	on	each	program	and	the	sort	
of	 taxes	 applied,	 even	 for	 better	 designing	 taxation	 policy	 such	 as	 the	 neglected	 Mexican	
indirect	tax	reform	to	impose	VAT	on	food	and	medicines	in	recent	times	(which	is	beyond	the	
goal	of	this	paper).	Our	results	for	VAT	progressivity	show	a	decreasing	burden	for	the	middle	
and	top	earners	as	an	indication	of	a	high	level	of	HI	induced	by	this	form	of	tax	(see	figure	6);	
however,	we	move	forward	to	decompose	the	effects	in	the	case	of	the	VAT	to	dig	deeply	and	
find	the	component	that	might	be	driven	the	hidden	regressivity.	
	
4.5	Analytical	approach	decomposition	of	tax	sources	
	
In	 this	 section	 we	 apply	 the	 decomposition	 of	 Kakwani	 index	 for	 indirect	 taxes	 as	 we	
previously	found	to	be	the	reason	of	relative	contribution	to	regressivity	in	the	Mexican	fiscal	
system.	Why	this	decomposition	can	be	relevant	to	highlight	policy	makers?	In	practice,	if	we	
observe	a	 low	level	of	progressivity	of	a	given	tax,	 like	VAT,	we	cannot	easily	determine	the	
source	 of	 this	 low	 level	 of	 progressivity.	 In	 others	 words,	 what	 are	 the	 tax	 sources	 that	
contribute	 the	most	 to	 the	 total	 progressivity?	 To	 illustrate	 this	 better,	we	present	 in	what	
follow	the	empirical	results	for	Mexico	2012	in	table	9.	As	it	was	seen	before,	the	progressivity	
of	the	VAT	tax	is	practically	zero	(Kakwani	index	was	about:	‐0.0023).	
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	When	Kakwani	index	is	negative	and	from	the	progressivity	curves	for	taxes	shown	in	Figure	
5,	 it	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	measurement	 of	 the	 extent	 of	 absolute	 regressivity,	 at	 least	 for	
those	percentiles	with	negative	difference.	Thus,	the	relative	contribution	can	be	interpreted	
as	the	contribution	to	the	total	regressivity.	For	instance,	the	relative	negative	contribution	of	
Food	and	beverages	on	total	VAT	indicates	that	this	group	of	consumption	is	regressive	as	 it	
reduces	the	progressivity	by	itself.	
Based	 on	 the	 results,	 even	 if	 some	 VAT	 tax	 sources	 show	 a	 high	 level	 of	 progressivity	 like	
those	 of	 Transportation	 and	 related	 goods	 and	 services,	 the	 total	 VAT	 tax	 effect	 show	
practically	 a	 nil	 level	 of	 progressivity	 (‐0.0023).	 Among	 the	 post	 consumptions	 that	 the	
government	can	act	to	improve	the	progressivity	of	the	total	VAT	taxation,	we	find	the	Health	
care	 and	 in	 Housing	 expenditures,	 including	 utilities	 posts,	 and	 in	 a	 lesser	 extent	
communication	services	as	well	as	clothing	and	footwear.	
	
Table	9.	Progressivity	decomposition	by	source	of	VAT:		Mexico,	2012.	
	VAT	on	:	
Tax	
Share	
Gini	index	of	
Gross	
Income	
Concentration	
Index	
Absolute	
Contribution	
Relative	
Contribution	
a\	Food	and	beverages	 2.62	 0.5521	 0.2896	 ‐0.0069	 309.74	
b\Alcohol	&	tobacco	 1.22	 0.5521	 0.5973	 0.0006	 ‐24.97	
Restaurants	&	related	services	 6.09	 0.5521	 0.6889	 0.0082	 ‐375.76	
Housing,	including	utilities	 8.28	 0.5521	 0.3819	 ‐0.0141	 635.89	
a\	Public	transportation	and	
related	goods	&	services	 13.06	 0.5521	 0.6536	 0.0133	 ‐598.18	
Furniture	and	equipment	 2.2	 0.5521	 0.6055	 0.0012	 ‐52.91	
Clothing	and	footwear	 7.5	 0.5521	 0.5182	 ‐0.0025	 114.64	
Recreation,	entertainment	and	
sports	 5.14	 0.5521	 0.6885	 0.007	 ‐316.14	
Communications	and	network	
services	 4.56	 0.5521	 0.4608	 ‐0.0042	 187.98	
	a\	Education	 14.84	 0.5521	 0.5718	 0.0029	 ‐131.99	
c\	Health	care	&	related	 29.14	 0.5521	 0.4947	 ‐0.0167	 754.27	
Insurance,	professional	&	
public	services	 5.35	 0.5521	 0.7188	 0.009	 ‐402.56	
Total	 100	 0.5521	 0.	5498	 ‐0.0023	 100.0	
Notes:		 a\	 zero	 rated.	 For	 soft‐drinks	 and	 sweetened	 beverages	 general	 rate	 is	 applied;	 some	 expenses	 on	
transportation,	such	as	 flights	or	car	rentals	are	taxed	at	 the	general	rate	as	well	as	spending	on	 fuel,	
gasoline	 and	 diesel;	 private	 and	 public	 education	 VAT	 is	 exempted	 when	 tuition	 is	 paid	 but	 other	
private	educational	expenses	are	taxed	at	the	general	rate.	
b\	 Alcoholic	 beverages	 include	 those	 purchased	 at	 the	 store	 and	 those	 consumed	 in	 a	 licensed	
establishment,	as	well	as	those	products	used	in	home	brewing	of	alcoholic	beverages.	
c\From	this	group	just	medicines	are	zero	rated.	
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
	
5.	Conclusions	
	
This	paper	focuses	on	the	study	of	the	redistributive	effect	and	progressivity	of	the	tax‐benefit	
system	 in	 Mexico.	 Even	 if	 the	 economic	 efficiency	 requires	 more	 free	 markets,	 these	 may	
induce	 a	 serious	 distributive	 failure.	 As	 a	 remedy	 to	 this,	 the	 regulator	 or	 the	 government	
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imposes	 in	 general	 a	 series	 of	 distributive	 corrections	 through	 the	 fiscal	 system	 and	 the	
benefits	 programs.	 This	 will	 ensure	 some	 equity	 and	 an	 acceptable	 level	 of	 social	 welfare.	
However,	even	if	 these	redistributive	mechanisms	are	helpful	to	correct	the	market	 failures,	
they	are	in	general	complex	and	can	encompass	some	distributive	imperfections.	The	need	of	
synthetizing	and	analysing	social	efficiency	of	the	tax/benefit	system,	 justifies,	 inter	alia,	 the	
corrections	to	be	undertaken.	In	this	paper,	we	try	to	shed	a	light	on	the	Mexican	tax‐benefit	
system	by	using	a	rich	and	nationally	representative	database	for	the	year	of	2012.	Mainly,	we	
start	by	studying	the	progressivity	of	 the	 tax/benefit	system.	 	Further,	we	propose	a	simple	
method	 of	 decomposition	 of	 progressivity	 indices	 in	 order	 to	 show	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	
different	sources	of	tax	or	of	benefit	to	the	total	progressivity.	
In	 order	 to	 show	 the	 extent	 of	 horizontal	 inequality	 and	 how	 the	 latter	 affects	 the	 vertical	
equity	of	the	tax/benefit	system,	the	DJA	model	was	applied	for	the	first	time	to	the	Mexican	
case.	Next,	we	summarize	the	main	findings	of	our	research:	
	
 In	 general,	 the	 tax/benefit	 system	 is	 progressive	 and	 reduces	 the	 Atkinson‐Gini	
inequality	 by	 about	 5.68	 points.	 Benefit	 programs	 exhibit	 more	 progressivity	
relatively	 to	 taxes.	 This	may	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 efficient	 targeting	 of	 poor	 and	 the	
higher	sensitivity	of	progressivity	indices	to	the	income	changes	in	the	bottom	part	of	
the	distribution.	When	social	transfers	are	applied,	the	tax/benefit	system	for	the	low	
income	contributors	becomes	more	progressive,	but	part	of	the	problems	is	linked	to	
coverage.	
 Results	of	the	DJA	model	show	that	the	benefit	Oportunidades	contributes	the	most	to	
VE.	It	shows	also	the	existence	of	a	relatively	high	level	of	horizontal	inequality	where	
the	HI	reduces	the	VE	by	about	25%.	This	can	be	explained	by	some	imperfections	in	
targeting	the	poor,	or	also,	in	the	structure	of	the	tax	system	when	reranking	is	about	
15%.	Reducing	the	HI	component	will	improve	the	social	efficiency	of	the	tax/benefit	
system,	and	this,	without	any	additional	need	of	funds.	This	aspect	must	be	studied	in	
future	 research	 to	 understand	 the	 effects	 from	 the	 current	 fiscal	 reforms	 in	 the	
country.	
 The	decomposition	of	progressivity	indices	shows	that	some	indirect	taxes	contribute	
significantly	to	lighten	the	progressivity	of	VAT.	The	results	identify	also	the	sources	of	
VAT	 that	 render	 nil	 the	 progressivity	 of	 this	 tax:	 health‐care	 and	 housing	
expenditures,	 as	 well	 as	 communication	 services,	 clothing	 and	 footwear.	 Of	 course,	
this	 is	 related	with	 the	pattern	of	distribution	of	 consumption	of	 the	different	 taxed	
goods.	
 Some	 of	 the	 benefits	 target	 less	 the	 poor	 group	 and	 may	 justify	 the	 need	 of	
restructuring	such	programs	in	order	to	make	them	more	efficient	and	less	expensive	
for	 the	 government.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 for	 scholarships	 with	 the	 highest	 standard	
deviation	as	well	as	the	benefits	for	the	elderly	and	Procampo.	
	
For	future	research	we	report	the	need	to	find	out	fiscal	redistributive	reforms	on	both	direct	
and	 indirect	 taxes	 which	 will	 serve	 to	 simultaneously	 increase	 revenues	 and	 redistribute	
better	the	income,	so	more	resources	could	be	allocated	in	the	most	progressive	programs	of	
transfers	to	strengthen	government	public	services	with	more	coverage	and	social	welfare.	
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Appendix	
	
	
Table	A1.	Per	capita	means	of	benefits	and	poverty	headcount	for	Mexican	provinces,	2012.			
Provinces	 Scholarships	 Oportunidades Procampo Elderly PAL Empleo	 Others	 Poverty/a
Aguascalientes	 8.6	 14.4 2.5 8.7 0.3 1.3	 0.0	 0.508
Baja	California	 1.9	 4.4 0.0 10.1 0.0 0.0	 0.0	 0.343
B.	Calif	Sur	 8.4	 12.8 0.0 11.4 1.0 0.6	 9.0	 0.306
Campeche	 6.5	 41.6 17.3 27.5 0.7 1.8	 4.1	 0.491
Coahuila	 4.4	 12.5 1.1 6.9 0.5 0.9	 0.5	 0.495
Collima	 55.9	 11.8 7.3 13.0 0.3 0.0	 22.4	 0.435
Chiapas	 2.9	 94.5 30.9 26.9 0.5 0.0	 33.9	 0.797
Chihuahua	 7.8	 11.9 45.5 26.4 2.3 0.2	 0.7	 0.526
Distrito	Federal	 12.9	 1.5 0.0 57.1 0.1 0.0	 15.6	 0.278
Durango	 7.7	 22.8 30.0 15.4 0.3 0.2	 3.5	 0.633
Guanajuato	 5.9	 27.2 8.4 16.4 0.1 0.0	 0.0	 0.531
Guerrero	 2.7	 67.1 6.3 29.5 0.3 0.1	 2.9	 0.700
Hidalgo	 5.6	 50.2 12.2 34.9 0.9 1.7	 0.8	 0.670
Jalisco	 29.8	 13.7 3.9 17.9 0.5 0.0	 1.4	 0.522
Edo	de	Mex	 4.0	 13.7 2.6 8.5 0.6 0.0	 0.1	 0.546
Michoacán	 5.3	 35.6 2.9 22.2 1.9 1.1	 0.0	 0.589
Morelos	 5.0	 28.7 7.4 27.3 1.5 0.0	 2.6	 0.545
Nayarit	 6.7	 27.1 15.6 36.2 0.0 2.9	 10.4	 0.475
Nuevo	León	 5.8	 5.5 0.0 17.6 0.0 0.6	 6.5	 0.266
Oaxaca	 1.6	 77.1 7.4 45.5 2.9 0.0	 4.7	 0.779
Puebla	 1.6	 48.3 10.5 16.2 0.4 0.0	 0.3	 0.658
Queretaro	 42.3	 23.3 6.5 18.9 0.0 0.3	 2.3	 0.435
Quintana	Roo	 4.7	 16.9 2.0 7.9 0.4 0.0	 0.0	 0.360
San	Luis	Potosi	 4.3	 55.5 32.6 30.4 0.3 0.0	 1.0	 0.596
Sinaloa	 11.5	 34.3 13.9 25.8 0.3 0.2	 2.4	 0.487
Sonora	 13.9	 16.6 3.1 22.5 0.0 0.0	 0.8	 0.403
Tabasco	 10.8	 52.3 2.3 15.2 4.5 0.5	 5.5	 0.557
Tamaulipas	 8.7	 12.5 44.3 13.9 0.2 0.4	 0.8	 0.418
Tlaxcala	 11.5	 29.8 8.9 17.4 1.5 2.2	 0.8	 0.716
Veracruz	 3.0	 46.6 8.7 15.2 0.0 1.1	 1.3	 0.601
Yucatan	 1.0	 39.6 17.7 23.6 0.2 0.2	 5.1	 0.588
Zacatecas	 8.5	 44.0 33.0 29.9 0.2 3.7	 3.5	 0.625
Mexico	 8.3	 28.9 10.1 22.1 0.6 0.4	 4.2	 0.525
Notes:	 	a	Total	poverty	using	CONEVAL	wellbeing	threshold.	
Source:	Author’s	elaboration	using	ENIGH,	2012.	
